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IntroductionIn June 2009, the Department of Economics at Queen's University,
Canada, organized a workshop on Normative tax theory.1 The purpose
was to honor Robin Boadway who was reaching the canonical age
of 65, and stepping down as editor of the Journal of Public Economics.2
A number of friends and colleagues of Robin, all members of his family
of theoretical public economists, presented and discussed their work.
This special issue brings together a selection of those papers that have
been screened through the usual refereeing process. It covers three
themes reﬂecting the lifelong interests of Robin: optimal income
taxation, optimal tax-transfer policy, and ﬁscal decentralization.
Theﬁrst theme, optimal income taxation, contains two papers. “How
Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes Change When the Distribution of the
Population Changes” by Craig Brett and John A. Weymark, investigates
the relevance of the size of the groups with different skill levels, for the
properties of the solution to the optimal nonlinear income tax problem.
Whenpreferences are quasilinear in leisure, it is possible todetermine in
what direction everyone's optimal consumption and optimal marginal
tax rate change. When preferences are quasilinear in consumption, it is
possible to determine in what direction everyone's optimal before-tax
income and optimal marginal tax rate change. The second paper is “A
comparison of optimal tax policies when compensation or responsibility
matter” by Laurence Jacquet and Dirk Van de gaer. It examines optimal
redistribution in a model with high- and low-skilled individuals having
heterogeneous tastes for labor. The paper also compares the extent to
which optimal policies based on different normative criteria obey the
principles of compensation (for differential skills) and responsibility
(for preferences for labor) when labor supply is along the extensive
margin. The authors argue that traditional welfarist criteria lead to
unappealing policy recommendations as they fail to take compensation
and responsibility issues into account. Criteria from the social choice
literature perform better in this regard, with the implication that the
Earned Income Tax Credit is deemed less desirable than the Negative
Income Tax.
The theme of optimal tax and transfer policy consists of three
papers. “Two-Tier Public Provision: Comparing Public Systems,” by
Gordon Myers and Christoph Lulfesmann, considers a two-tier
institution in which the government provides public services, but
individuals can opt out of public provision (but not taxes). Funding
for the public service is chosen endogenously by majority vote. The
equilibrium tax rate is never above and likely below the one found in
a one-tier system in which opting out of public consumption is1 Kate Cuff, Mick Keen, Nicolas Marceau, and Pierre Pestieau were the scientiﬁc
organizers; Sumon Majumdar was a very efﬁcient local organizer. The ISPE
(International Seminar for Public Economics) is acknowledged for its support.
2 Robin acted as a co-editor from January 1999 to December 2002 and as an editor
from January 2003 to December 2008.
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doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.001prohibited. This is because the public system loses the political
support of the rich who exit. A majority in the society always
welcomes a transition to a two-tier system; it is the only system that is
stable in an evolutionary sense. This is followed by Helmuth Cremer,
Firouz Gahvari and Pierre Pestieau's paper titled “Fertility, human
capital accumulation, and the pension system.” The paper provides a
uniﬁed treatment of externalities associated with fertility and human
capital accumulation within pay-as-you-go pension systems. It con-
siders an overlapping-generations model in which every generation
consists of high earners and low earners with the proportion of
types being determined endogenously. The number of children is
deterministically chosen but the children's future ability is in part
stochastic, in part determined by the family background, and in
part through education. In addition to the customary externality
source associated with a change in average fertility rate, this setup
highlights another externality source. This is due to the effect of a
parent's choice of number and educational attainment of his children
on the proportion of high-ability individuals in the steady state. The
third paper is “Optimal Policies and the Informal Sector” by Katherine
Cuff, Nicolas Marceau, Steeve Mongrain, and Joanne Roberts. This
paper characterizes optimal policies in the presence of tax evasion
and undocumented workers in a model where the government
policy consists of a tax on ﬁrms, a level of public good, and a level of
enforcement. Equilibrium is characterized as segmented or non-
segmented, depending on whether domestic workers work exclu-
sively in the formal sector (segmented) or in the informal sector
as well (non-segmented). Surprisingly, in equilibrium, wages are
always equalized between domestic and undocumented workers,
even if they do not work in the same sectors of the economy. This is
driven by the interaction between decisions by the ﬁrm and optimal
government policy.
The third theme of the Conference, ﬁscal federalism, also consists
of three papers. “Incentive Equivalence with Fixed Migration Costs,” by
Sam Bucovetsky, starts with the well-known proposition that
decentralization is efﬁcient if migration between communities is
costless, and if policy makers in each community anticipate the
migration response to policy changes. The contribution of this paper
is that this proposition requires certain convexity assumptions
regarding technology or tastes. This formulation differs from the
more common “attachment to home” assumption of heterogeneous
migration costs. Conditional on the direction of migration, interests
of different communities are still perfectly aligned. But natives of
different communities may prefer different directions of migration,
weakening incentive equivalence if local policy makers have the
power to induce large changes in migration ﬂows. However, incentive
equivalence fails only if economies of scale in population are
important, so that communities may be “under-populated”. Next,
1238 Editorial“Optimal Fiscal Federalism In The Presence Of Tax Competition” by John
D. Wilson and Eckhard Janeba, models the optimal division of public
goods provision between central and regional governments in an
economy with interregional tax competition. Regional provision is
inefﬁcient because governments compete for scarce capital by
lowering their capital taxes and public good levels to inefﬁciently
low levels. Central provision is inefﬁcient because it is determined
by the minimum winning coalition within a legislature. The optimal
degree to which public good provision should be decentralized de-
pends on a tradeoff between these inefﬁciencies. This is followed by
David Wildasin's “Fiscal Competition for Imperfectly-Mobile Labor and
Capital: A Comparative Dynamic Analysis.” This paper investigates
the comparative dynamics of adjustment to changes in local ﬁscalpolicy with two imperfectly mobile productive resources. The inter-
temporal adjustments for both resources depend on complementarity/
substitutability in production and the adjustment cost technologies
for each, implying that the evaluation of the ﬁscal treatment of one
resource must account for the simultaneous adjustment of both.
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